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THE DEATH OF A CAR COMPANY  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Type of paper: Case study.  
 
Purpose 
The aim of this paper is to understand how large and apparently successful 
organizations enter spirals of decline that are very difficult to reverse.  The paper 
examines the case of Rover, once one of the largest car producers in the world, which 
collapsed in 2005. An analysis of strategic and operational choices made over a period 
of 40 years investigates the reasons for, and consequences of, a growing mismatch 
between the context faced by the company (industry dynamics, market conditions) and 
its operational capabilities, a mismatch that ultimately brought about the company’s 
demise.  
 
Methodology/Approach 
The paper is based on interviews with 32 people, including senior managers (including 
four chief executives), government ministers and union officials who were key 
decision-makers within, or close to, the company during the period 1968 and 2005. 
Secondary sources and documentary evidence (e.g. production and sales data) are used 
to build up a historical picture of the company and to depict its deteriorating financial 
and market position from 1968 onwards. 
 
Findings 
The company was formed from a multitude of previously independent firms as part of a 
government-sponsored agenda to build a UK national champion in the car industry.  
The merged company failed due to several factors including poor product development 
processes, poor manufacturing performance, difficult labour relations, a very wide 
product portfolio and a lack of financial control.  Although strenuous efforts were made 
to address those issues, including periods of whole or part ownership by British 
Aerospace, Honda and BMW, the company’s position deteriorated until eventually 
production volumes were too low for viable operation. 
 
Implications 
The case of Rover highlights the importance of what has been termed ‘the management 
unit’ in complex systems.  The management unit comprises processes and routines to 
deal with challenges such as managing product portfolios, connecting strategic and 
operational choices, and scanning and responding to the environment.  In the case of 
Rover, a number of factors taken together generated excessive load on a management 
unit frequently operating under conditions of resource scarcity.  We conclude that 
viewing corporate failure from a systems perspective, rather than in terms of 
shortcomings in specific sub-systems, such as manufacturing or product development, 
yields insights often absent in the Operations Management literature. 
 
Keywords: Automotive industry, strategy, operations, business failure. 
 
 
 3 
THE DEATH OF A CAR COMPANY  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The start of the second automotive century has been interesting for the global 
motor industry. The industry has seen both record profits and losses, as well as 
bankruptcies amongst global suppliers and manufacturers, some of the largest industry 
mergers and de-mergers, and – largely thanks to emerging new markets – increased 
global demand for automobiles. 
Recent dynamics within the global motor industry have several implications for 
the academic study of the industry. Regional stereotypes that in the past have 
predominantly compared Japanese producers to their Western counterparts (for 
example Womack et al. 1990, Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991; Hines 1998) now only 
partially hold. All but two Japanese vehicle manufacturers have been taken over, or had 
major stakes acquired, by Western manufacturers. Nissan, for example, which was once 
were the subject of best practice case studies (DETR 1998), faced near-bankruptcy in 
the late 1990s and merged with Renault. 
The changing fortunes of the automotive industry have affected firms in Japan, 
Europe and the US alike. Most prominently, the cost of restructuring (and downsizing) 
in the US automotive industry has impacted on US domestic manufacturers in 
particular. The Ford Motor Company posted losses of $12.6bn in 2006, and $2.67bn 
loss in 2007; GM faced similar losses of $8.6bn in 2005, but has since returned to 
marginal profitability (Company Annual Reports). The future of Chrysler is uncertain 
after its 2007 de-merger from Daimler, a joint venture that entered the record books in 
Germany as destroying the most value (approx. €40bn) in the country’s post-war 
history. The Western European industry has seen a stream of production facilities 
relocating to Eastern Europe, putting further strain on national champions such as 
Renault, Volkswagen and Fiat. Moreover, incumbent manufacturers are threatened by a 
wave of low-cost imports from China and India, following the same pattern of the 
Japanese makers in the 1970s, and the Koreans in the 1990s.  In short, the level of 
competition in this very mature industry has reached a level where it threatens the 
survival of new-entrant and established players alike. In 2005Rover, as one of the 
weakest of the established players, was the first “national champion” in the Western 
world market to exit the industry. 
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In this paper we will explore how a large corporation entered a dynamic that 
ultimately led to its demise. We do so by telling the story of the Rover car company, 
which went from being one of the largest car producers in the world to oblivion over a 
period of 40 years. 
 Our point of departure is that the automotive industry, like other industries, 
follows a technology cycle. More or less all countries with indigenous car industries 
have been through a pattern of proliferation and consolidation of numbers of producers 
(Utterback, 1994). The emergence of a new technology (such as the internal 
combustion engine at the end of the 19th century) typically creates an influx of players, 
all keen to try their hand in the new arena. This period usually lasts until a dominant 
design emerges (for example, in the case of passenger cars, the use of four wheels, 
propulsion by an internal combustion engine, an enclosed steel body, etc). At this point 
the basis of competitive advantage shifts to away from issues of basic design and 
configuration, around which producers converge, and towards product and 
organizational attributes such as production efficiency, style, marketing or other 
criteria. Less capable companies are forced to exit the market, or are taken over by the 
stronger ones.  In the US, for example, in the mid-1920s there were 75 vehicle 
producers, but by 1960 this was down to 10, and in 2006 there are just three.  In the 
UK, no fewer than 221 vehicle producers entered the market between 1901 and 1905, 
of which 90% had either exited the sector or gone out of business altogether by 1914 
(Saul, 1962). In 1920 in the UK there were 90 manufacturers of passenger cars; by 
1929 this had dropped to 41; by 1939 to 33; by 1946 to 32; and by 1950 there were just 
20 – about the same as the number of producers in the US at that time, but with a much 
smaller total production volume (Church 1994). 
 The significance of these patterns to this paper is that our analysis of the failure 
of Rover should be seen against a background of industry consolidation and 
rationalization (at least in the mature economies) that has been occurring over many 
decades, and in which there are inevitably winners and losers. Our purpose in the paper 
is to understand why one particular company, once in a position of apparent strength, 
disappeared from sight. Did Rover lack capabilities that other car companies 
possessed? Or did the company face particular circumstances, that other car companies 
did not, that brought about its demise?  
This paper and the research on which is based did not start out as a conventional 
piece of hypothesis or theory testing. When Rover collapsed in 2005 we became 
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curious about the reasons for this, partly because of the explanations for the collapse 
that appeared in the media. These largely focused on recent management decisions, and 
placed the blame for the collapse on the Phoenix Consortium, who owned the company 
for the final five years of its life. Although not explicitly stated, we set out with the 
implicit assumption that at least some of the factors that brought about the ultimate 
demise of Rover predated the Phoenix ownership; we also assumed that these dynamics 
could not be understood purely on the basis of secondary data, and that we would 
therefore need to gather data on the perceptions and context that senior decision-makers 
faced throughout the history of the firm. 
We therefore interviewed a cross-section of key people involved in the 
company from its creation in the late 1960s through to its collapse in 2005, 
complemented with an analysis of secondary sources, as described in the section on the 
research approach. Preliminary analysis of these data revealed that the company faced 
many challenges. At various times in its life these included deficiencies in product 
development processes and manufacturing systems; chronic labour relations problems; 
a very challenging economic environment due to trade liberalization and unfavourable 
exchange rates; and multiple changes of ownership, including a substantial period 
under government ownership. Consequently, identifying a conceptual framework that 
was simple enough to be comprehendible and yet at the same time comprehensive 
enough to cope with such a diverse set of issues was a major challenge.  
In practice, this occurred in two stages. First, a brief review of the Operations 
Management literature was used to construct a basic framework to understand the core 
processes and capabilities of a car company. Secondly, ideas from the literature on 
systems thinking, in particular those on viable systems (Beer 1984) were used to 
provide insight into how the company failed as a complete system. We turned to 
systems thinking because it became clear that the company faced multiple challenges 
and failings in a variety of sub-systems, not just one or two. Moreover, it was also clear 
that many people in the company were aware of these failings at the time, but for a 
variety of reasons appeared incapable of correcting them. This suggested that a systems 
perspective might be the most appropriate one to take. 
 
Capabilities of a Car Company 
There is clearly much more to being a car company than simply assembling 
vehicles, even though this is the most visible part of the process of vehicle production. 
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Car making comprises a complex set of processes, and orchestrating these successfully 
is a major organisational challenge. A typical vehicle comprises 10-15,000 individual 
parts, sourced by the manufacturer in the form of 2,000-4,000 distinct components 
(Holweg and Pil, 2004), and a typical volume car model will have a production run 
comprising of 500,000 units or more.  
 In this section we develop a framework for analysing the core capabilities that 
car companies must possess if they are to be effective. We use Heller, Fujimoto and 
Mercer’s (2005) definition of a ‘fully capable’ car company as one that is ‘able to 
independently design, manufacture and market a vehicle’.  These capabilities are shown 
diagrammatically in Figure 1 and their key characteristics are summarized in Table 1. 
 Figure 1 depicts the classic process of product development, production and 
distribution typical of an automotive value chain. New product development typically 
begins with analyses of both market needs and available technologies; the relative 
influence of these determine whether a process is “technology push” or “market-pull”. 
Such intelligence informs choices in product design and development, although the 
extent to which this happens in practice can vary considerably. 
 
Take in Figure 1 
 
 In the automotive industry, developing new products involves many functions 
within the car companies themselves, and dozens, possibly hundreds of suppliers. 
These include engineers and designers who design the product, suppliers who provide a 
variety of specialist parts, and the manufacturing function who have to produce the 
vehicles in high volume and consistently to the required levels of quality and cost 
(Clark and Fujimoto 1991). The development of a new vehicle demands many 
thousands of choices and decisions, large and small, by many people. Over successive 
development cycles these choices and decisions combine to give companies and their 
products particular attributes - capabilities, scale, brand values and other sources of 
competitive advantage - or disadvantage. Strong brands, such as the BMW brand with 
its image of the ‘ultimate driving machine’ or Audi’s ‘Vorsprung durch Technik’ do 
not develop overnight, but rather require years, perhaps decades, of consistency in how 
choices in design, manufacturing and marketing are made and presented to consumers 
(Bayley, 1986). Similarly, companies that lack consistency in such decisions, for 
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example across models or over time, for example due to changes in personnel or 
ownership, may suffer from weak or confused brand attributes (Aaker, 1991). 
 
Take in Table 1 
 
 The core capabilities in Table 1 are well recognized in the Operations 
Management community. They include processes of product development (Clark and 
Fujimoto, 1991), manufacturing (Schonberger, 1982; 1986; Womack, Jones and Roos, 
1990), buyer-supplier relations (Lamming, 1993; Sako, 1992) and logistics and 
distribution and retail (Kiff, 1997; Holweg and Pil, 2004; Reichhart and Holweg, 
2007). Other processes, such as market intelligence and the management of retail 
systems have generally received less attention by the Operations Management 
community, although such analyses do exist (Delbridge and Oliver 1991; Oliver and 
Delbridge 1991). 
 
Viable Systems 
Although the core capabilities framework goes a considerable way to providing 
a diagnostic for success and failure in the auto industry, preliminary analysis of the 
Rover data indicated that of itself the core capabilities framework did not explain the 
whole picture. As we shall see, many people within the company, at various points in 
its life, were acutely aware of shortcomings in areas such as product development, 
manufacturing and labour relations and there were strenuous efforts to correct these. 
The problem seemed to be that addressing all of these issues together and sufficiently 
rapidly appeared to be beyond the reach of successive management teams. This 
appeared to be a function of the totality of the parts, rather than any individual element, 
and this realization led us towards systems theory, specifically the work of Stafford 
Beer (1994) on systems viability, in search of an appropriate additional conceptual 
framework.  
 
The chief proponent of theory on systems viability is Beer. Beer’s ideas have 
been developed in a number of books and articles (Beer, 1972; 1979; 1984; Jackson, 
2001) and we shall simply summarize the key points here. Beer’s first concept is that 
the major challenge in managing any system is variety - that subsystems must be 
controlled by a meta-system, or “management unit” and that the capacity of the 
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metasystem to process information must be commensurate with the ability of the sub-
systems to generate it - otherwise overload will result, and the system is likely to enter 
a catatonic state, and become paralysed.  This builds on Ashby’s “Law of requisite 
variety” (1956) and is similar to the information-processing perspective on 
organizational design (Galbraith 1974), which maintains that the critical limiting factor 
of an organization is its ability to process information. Thus, managers within an 
organization that faces too many problems simultaneously may be acutely aware of the 
shortcomings in particular areas, but be unable to devote sufficient attention to resolve 
these, due to demands in others. 
A second key concept is that below the meta-system are four subsystems, the 
precise details of which need not concern us in this paper, but which comprise critical 
functions or operational subsystems and that absence or inadequacy on the part of these 
can threaten system viability. Examples include sub-systems to monitor the 
environment, to make policy, and integrate the activities of operational subsystems.  
A third concept is that diversity of goals. Most organizations serve multiple 
stakeholders and must therefore of necessity pursue multiple goals. However, Beer 
argues that if there are too many divergent views of what a system should do goals may 
be incommensurate, leading to the problems of paralysis described above. Partly this is 
a problem of attention – the ‘management unit’ is forced to meter out its attention to 
too many lines of activity. However, it is also a political issue, in that building support 
for a particular strategy or direction is that much more difficult when views as to the 
purpose and priorities of the organization are widely divergent.  
With this background the questions and objectives of this paper can therefore be 
summarized as follows: 
• How can the failure of Rover best be understood? 
• Through analysis of the failure of Rover can we identify patterns that 
may apply to other examples of corporate failure? 
• To what extent can systems theory provide a useful framework to think 
about failure in large complex organizations?  
 
RESEARCH APPROACH 
 The demise of the British motor industry has been the subject of several 
analyses (see for example Dunnett, 1980; Church, 1994; Whisler, 1999). Commonly 
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based on secondary sources, these contributions describe in detail the patterns of how 
BLMC/British Leyland/Rover (the company was re-named a number of times during its 
life) and the British motor industry in general, declined over time. However, most 
provide only limited explanations as to why British Leyland/Rover entered such a spiral 
of decline. While this paper also draws extensively on secondary sources (production 
data, annual reports, government select committee meeting notes, official reports, 
previous published studies), our assessment as to why BL/Rover failed is 
complemented by a total of 32 interviews with a cross section of people involved with 
the company in a variety of roles. These include 19 senior executives, including several 
CEOs who ran the company during the period 1968-2005, nine executives from Honda, 
Rover’s partner for 15 years, a major figure in the company’s retail and distribution 
network, a senior union official, and two former government ministers responsible for 
industrial policy. The interviews were conducted between October 2005 and August 
2007, after the company had collapsed, and typically lasted between one and three 
hours. They focused on the choices and events that, in the view of the interviewee had 
proved critical to the fortunes of the company. 
 The interviews followed a common format, with variations according to the 
position of the particular interviewee and the period with which they were most 
familiar with the company.  Figures 3,4 and 5, which show Rover’s volume of output 
and market share between 1970 and 2005 were produced from secondary sources 
before the interviews commenced, and these were presented to the interviewees, who 
were asked to tell their version of ‘the story behind the numbers ‘, with particular 
reference to the period in which they were most closely associated with the company.  
Interviews followed a common schedule. Each interview commenced by asking 
interviewees to describe:  
• Critical events – both internal and external to the company 
• Key opportunities that presented themselves to the company – possibly opportunities 
that were not recognized as such at the time 
• Key choices, both correct and incorrect (and possibly only recognizable as such with 
hindsight) 
• Key market and competitor dynamics 
• Conclusions about this period, including how the company compared to its competitors 
during this time 
 
Interviewees were asked to do this period by period, the periods being: 
• Mid 1960s to 1975 (up to nationalization) 
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• 1975 to 1987 (Nationalization/Honda) 
• 1987 to 1994 (Bae/Honda) 
• 1994-2000 (BMW) 
• 2000-2005 (Phoenix) 
• 2005- Brief predictions for the future (e.g. Rover under Chinese ownership). 
 
As the research covered a period of 40 years, no single interviewee had detailed 
information about the whole period, but several overlapped in their times with the company. 
Where this was the case differences in perspective were surfaced and tested, by feeding back 
the accounts of interviewees (unascribed) to others and asking them to comment. Some of these 
differences in perspective were profound, An example of this were labour relations and the role 
of organized labour in the company’s decline; those speaking from a union perspective had a 
very different view of history from those speaking from a management perspective. 
Throughout this historical account interviewees were also asked questions about 
particular processes within the company and how these were enacted at different times. These 
included perceptions of the company’s strengths and weaknesses in different areas, including 
marketing, product development, manufacturing, suppliers, distribution and sales and so on.  
All interviewees were also asked when, in their view, the company passed the point of no 
return, a question which elicited an extraordinarily wide range of responses. All interviews 
were recorded and professionally transcribed. 
The account presented in this paper thus represents ‘a best fit’ of what is in fact 
a complex and in some areas contested story. 
 
THE ROVER STORY 
 Rover’s history in many ways reflects the classic pattern of industry 
proliferation and consolidation described by Utterback (1994). As the UK auto industry 
matured, there were closures and mergers, but in the post-WWII period the industry 
was still relatively small in terms of its aggregate output and fragmented in its 
ownership and production organization.  There were successive mergers and attempts at 
consolidation from 1950 to 1970 as explicit efforts were made to build a British 
automotive company capable of holding its own in the world.  Ford in particular was 
regarded as the model to emulate. Although there were a number of amalgamations 
during the first half of the 20th century, this began in earnest with the merger of Austin 
and Morris in 1952 into the British Motor Corporation (BMC). Jaguar joined in 1966 
and the company became British Motor Holdings (BMH). In 1960 Standard-Triumph 
became part of Leyland Motors as did Rover, in 1967. These two groups, British Motor 
Holdings and what was by then the Leyland Motor Corporation, joined together to form 
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the British Leyland Motor Corporation (BMLC) in 1968.  Thus, consolidation took 
place over a period of years but the life of the consolidated firm was relatively short. 
By 1984, under the wing of a Conservative government committed to privatization, a 
process of disaggregation was underway, with several operations either floated off as 
independent enterprises or sold to other car companies (e.g. Jaguar, Leyland trucks, 
Unipart). The main steps in this process of consolidation and disintegration are shown 
in Figure 2. 
 
Take in Figure 2 
 
Thus, the Rover car company had not one, but many different starting points. 
Rover itself was established, as a bicycle manufacturer, in 1878 with its first car 
produced in 1904. Triumph, Austin and Morris were all established between 1885 and 
1915.  Austin and Morris joined forces in the 1950s and formed BMC, the idea being to 
create a British car manufacturer to rival Ford. However, the Austin-Morris merger was 
largely defensive and the animosity that existed between the two companies prior to 
merger continued post-merger. This rivalry impeded efforts to build a single company 
and lingered for many years. Despite this, BMC pioneered a number of influential 
innovations, such as the Mini, launched in 1959. This was an Austin product and was 
designed by Alec Issigonis, who had also designed the Morris Minor. The Mini was the 
first car to combine front-wheel drive and a transversely mounted engine using 
continuous velocity joints in the drivetrain. This breakthrough subsequently became the 
industry standard in layout for small to medium-sized vehicles and the Mini was to stay 
in production for over 40 years. Commercial success, however, was more elusive; 
relatively high costs and a low selling price meant that the margins on the Mini were 
wafer thin, and at some points in its life, negative. 
For Rover, not yet part of BMC, the 1950s and 1960s were fruitful years, with the 
success of Land Rover. Rover also conducted pioneering research into gas turbine 
vehicles. In 1967, Rover became part of the Leyland Motor Company, marking the end 
for Rover as an independent company.  
When BLMC was formed in 1968 the combined company enjoyed production 
volumes of close to one million units in the early 1970s, but struggled to integrate its 
operations across the different constituent companies. Consolidation occurred, but the 
integration upon which the success of the consolidation depended, did not. 
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With worsening finances, BLMC was nationalised in 1975 and renamed British 
Leyland. It received a £2 billion government cash injection (an equivalent of £11.4 
billion in 2005 terms, calculated by GDP deflation) to modernise its plants and its 
products, but matters continued to worsen. Michael Edwardes was brought in as CEO 
in 1977 to steer the company forward (renaming it (‘BL Ltd’) and the company joined 
forces with Honda in 1979, as it became clear that the company was incapable of 
developing sufficient new models on its own. In 1979 Honda signed a collaboration 
agreement, and granted Rover the right to produce one of its models, sold as the 
Triumph Acclaim. Honda later agreed that Rover should produce other Honda designs 
for sale as Rovers and produce some Honda vehicles in the UK on Honda’s behalf.  
Subsequently the two companies arranged a cross-shareholding with Honda taking a 
20% stake in Rover, and Rover taking a 20% stake in Honda’s European manufacturing 
operation.  
In 1982, there was another name-change; British Leyland became Austin Rover. 
The Rover badge was used on a range of cars co-developed with Honda: the first 
Honda-sourced model to carry the Rover badge, released in 1984, was the Rover 200, 
which, like the Triumph Acclaim that it replaced, was based on the Honda Ballade. In 
1986, the Rover SD1 was replaced by the Rover 800, which was based on the Honda 
Legend. That year Graham Day became head of the company which in 1987 was 
renamed ‘the Rover Group’ and adopted a one-brand strategy.  The Austin Maestro and 
Montego, by then badged as Rovers, were replaced by the Rover 400 and Rover 600 
which were based on Honda's Civic and Accord platforms.  
In 1988 the company was sold to British Aerospace (BAe). It remained under 
BAe’s ownership for six years, until in 1994 BAe put Rover up for sale as part of a 
move to focus effort on their core aerospace business; Rover was sold to BMW. Shortly 
before the deal was closed, strenuous attempts were made to convince Honda to 
increase its stake from 20% and take over Rover, but Honda refused to do this. Even on 
the morning when the deal with BMW was due to be closed, Rover executives were in 
Tokyo trying to persuade Honda to take a majority stake in Rover, but Honda would 
not increase its share to more than 47.5%. This was not sufficient for BAe, and so 
Rover passed to BMW for £800 million. BMW invested considerably in Rover, in 
particular the development of the Rover 75 and the New Mini. 
Six years on, in May 2000, after two consecutive years of heavy losses and 
failure to secure sufficient government subsidies for the replacement for the mid-range 
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25 and 45 models, BMW broke up the business and Rover was sold. One of the would-
be buyers was a group of venture capitalists, Alchemy Partners, but there was 
widespread resistance to Alchemy in favour of the Phoenix Group, headed by former 
Rover CEO John Towers, who had left the company after the takeover by BMW. 
Alchemy had proposed to convert Rover into a low-volume sports car company, 
focussing on MG-branded sports cars, a concept initially favoured by the government, 
but abandoned after workers’ protests in London. Subsequently, the Phoenix offer was 
supported. Phoenix bought Rover for £10 and pledged to keep all employees in work, 
aiming to return a profit within two years. Renamed “MG Rover”, the company 
received a 49-year loan of £470m by BMW and a licence to use the Rover brand.  
At the same time, BMW sold Land Rover to Ford for £1.8bn, including the 
Gaydon R&D facility and the Solihull plant. BMW retained the new Mini, launched in 
2001, and the facilities to build it at Cowley, near Oxford. As a result, Rover 75 
production was moved to Longbridge. Rover now produced the 25, 45, and 75 at 
Longbridge, but was now deprived of two of its key brands (Mini and Land Rover), and 
having lost most of its R&D personnel due to the sale of Gaydon.  
From 2000 onwards the decline of MG Rover continued. In 2001, eight month 
operating losses of £254m were reported. Amidst the acquisition of the Italian sportscar 
maker Qvale (which led to the creation of the SV sportscar, of which a total of 25 were 
sold by April 2005), the company announced an alliance with the Chinese group China 
Brilliance, to help fund investment in new models. However, this deal was not 
completed, despite an initial cash injection by the Chinese company. In 2003 there were 
losses of £77m and production output fell further. In an effort to raise cash, the 
Longbridge site was sold for £45 million, and leased back. In November 2004 a plan 
for a £1bn joint venture with the Shanghai Automotive Industrial Corporation was 
announced, and the rights for the 25, 75 models and the K-series engines were sold to 
SAIC (another Chinese automotive firm) for £67m.  
 By March 2005 sales had continued to fall, and some suppliers were demanding 
cash payment upon delivery of components. A rescue mission to save the SAIC deal in 
April 2005 failed, although a bridging loan of £100m by the British Government was 
offered, and some suppliers stopped their deliveries of components. On 15 April 2005, 
all 5,100 Longbridge workers faced redundancy after production was halted there. A 
century of car production at Longbridge had ended. In July 2005 Rover’s remaining 
assets were sold to Nanjing Automotive, who dismantled the majority of production 
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assets and shipped them to China. Since “token” low-volume production of MGF sports 
cars at Longbridge has resumed.  In September 2006 there was another twist; Ford 
exercised its right to buy the Rover trademark under the terms of its purchase of 
Landover in 2000, largely as a defensive measure to protect the Land Rover brand. 
Nanjing responded by creating the ‘Roewe’ brand (‘Rong Wei’ or ‘Grand Prestige’ in 
Chinese), with a logo strongly resembling the old Rover badge.  
In June 2007, Ford announced its intention to sell both Land Rover and Jaguar, 
with Tata emerging as a likely buyer. Shanghai and Nanjing automotive corporations 
announced a government-supported merger in early 2008, reuniting the IPR and 
production assets needed to build the previous Rover models and engines in China. 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
Having sketched out the story of Rover, in this section we examine the each 
period in the company’s history in more detail. Of necessity, our treatment is selective, 
in that it is clearly difficult to cover all the details of a period of nearly 40 years in a 
short paper. We highlight those issues that emerged repeatedly across multiple 
interviewees as significant in the company’s decline. The declining output of the 
company between 1968 and 2005 is shown in Figure 3. We shall refer to this repeatedly 
as we analyse events at Rover. 
 
1968-1975 – The First Years of the Conglomerate 
As we have seen, in 1968, the company, then named BLMC, was formed out of a 
disparate set of previously independent companies, some of them themselves formed 
from previous amalgamations. This paper deals only with the cars operations, but for 
the first 15 years of its existence the conglomerate produced much more than just cars.  
Its output included trucks, buses, construction equipment, commercial refrigeration 
equipment and a miscellany of other products. This wide range of products greatly 
complicated the overall management task and reduced the focus - and resources - 
available for the development of the car business, consistent with Beer’s observations 
on requisite variety.  Indeed, until 1975 there was no single unit in control of all car 
operations. There was a history of strong concept engineering, which generally 
stemmed from exceptional single designers, such as Alec Issigonis in the case of the 
Mini and 1100/1300 series, and Spen King in the case of the Range Rover. One of the 
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product development executives who we interviewee reported how Issigonis resisted 
evolutionary changes to his original design, even though market analysis indicated that 
these would increase the vehicles’ appeal.  Another interviewee, a member of the Board 
during the 1970s and 1980s, reported the same pattern with respect to King and the 
Range Rover, which was not produced in a four-door version until many years after its 
launch. A side effect of such behaviour was an emphasis on what might be termed 
‘intuitive engineering’ and a consequent lack of process and discipline. This had at least 
three effects. First, with increasing vehicle complexity and sophistication, intuitive 
approaches to engineering were progressively less capable of delivering the 
consistency, thoroughness and follow-through necessary to produce well-engineered 
vehicles.  
Secondly, the presence of a small number of outstanding engineers generated 
and perpetuated a myth that engineering competence was actually higher than in fact it 
was – previous strength in what was essentially concept engineering was over-
generalized to other aspects of the company’s operations. This is quite a subtle process, 
and hinged on the existence of high-profile examples that run counter to a general 
trend, therefore allowing participants to believe that criticism of vehicle design and 
quality was less warranted than it actually was. In Rover’s case this perpetuated a belief 
than things were much better than they actually were in terms of basic standards of 
engineering and manufacturing. Third, ‘hero-engineers’ felt a strong sense of 
ownership of their concepts and were resistant to subsequent changes to the products 
that were the embodiment of these, even if this was clearly what the market was 
demanding. For example, Issigonis resisted the replacement of his original sliding 
windows with wind-down windows on the Mini, and King blocked the addition of a 
four-door model to the Range Rover series (his original had only two doors) for many 
years. As a product development executive explained: 
 
‘The engineer was held as a bit of an idol, not only in the company, but 
outside as well.  It was really critical, so if anybody challenged their 
territory it was a matter of life and death, almost.  A lot of the energy of 
the company was actually involved in this internal positioning, rather 
than saying, ‘the Japanese are producing some interesting things, Fiat 
have got some stuff, VW are producing the Golf’.  These things were 
going on outside, but a lot of the energy was about how to hold on to 
your territory, and create things in your part of the company.’ 
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 Many car companies have grown through a process of relatively strong, large 
companies acquiring relatively weaker, smaller ones. There have of course also been 
examples of mergers of pairs of relatively equal companies such as Renault and Nissan 
and Chrysler and Mercedes-Benz, but these are relatively unusual. In the case of 
BLMC, what effectively occurred was the simultaneous amalgamation of many 
previously independent companies, some with niche strengths (such as Rover, Jaguar) 
but combined with the volume business of Austin-Morris which was described by 
several interviewees as ‘a mess’. As one of the ex-Rover CEOs put it: 
‘When I joined in ’69 I joined a sprawling, fragmented, disparate entity 
called BLMC, which had just been formed.  Looking back, Donald 
Stokes [the first CEO] had been handed an impossible restructuring task.  
[…] It was the mother of all integration projects.’ 
 
When companies grow organically, they gradually develop the capabilities 
necessary to manage enormous scale and complexity – what we earlier termed the 
‘management unit’ - techniques of financial control, costing, budgeting, marketing and 
portfolio management commensurate with their scale. In Beer’s terms, this ensures that 
the sophistication of the coordinating mechanisms is commensurate with the variety of 
operations that have to be coordinated. Yet BLMC was essentially a collection of 
relatively small owner-managed enterprises (in ethos, if not necessarily legally so), 
each of which individually lacked these capabilities. Moreover, some of these were 
themselves in a very weak condition, so it was not that they could be left to their own 
devices with any great prospect of prospering. With hindsight, combining them made 
the problems worse, not better. John Egan, who was later to become CEO of Jaguar 
described it thus: 
 
‘You had all of these currents running through the BL story of how they 
didn’t know how to design new products, poor industrial relations, a 
poor rationalisation program, really quite anarchic in terms of 
managerial process.  You had government programs going on like 
regionalisation and stop-go, which didn’t give them much of a chance 
either, and a relatively ill-educated management team.  You add it all up 
and the chance that possibly they had was frittered away between 1970 
and 1974.  There was no coherence in anything.’ 
 
There were attempts to redress these shortfalls in the management system, one 
manifestation of which was significant recruitment from Ford, particularly in the areas 
of finance and product planning. However, in the early days the central staff who were 
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tasked with doing this were very few in number – an estimated 20 people, which for a 
very diverse organization of nearly 200,000 was extremely small.  
 Even before the creation of BLMC, Austin-Morris had been generating 
insufficient funds for model renewal, and the amalgamation created another layer of 
problems and complexity with which the corporation was ill-equipped to deal. Whilst 
struggling with its post-merger issues, in the early 1970s BLMC was hit by two forces 
over which it had no control – the removal of tariffs on vehicle imports into the UK 
with Britain’s entry into the European Union, and the first oil shock. These, combined 
with the company’s weaknesses in design and production quality, produced a 
catastrophic fall in output, from around 900,000 units a year in 1971 to just 600,000 in 
1976. The oil shock hit all car producers of course and output dipped across the 
industry. However, for most producers output recovered, but for BLMC it did not, apart 
from a brief uplift in 1976, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Take in Figure 3 
 
1975-1987 - State Ownership 
In 1975, nationalization brought a substantial injection of funds, and the slogan was 
‘product-led recovery’. However, although the injection of resources could have 
addressed the shortage of funds to develop new products, the underlying capability to 
do so was still seriously lacking. In the two years following nationalization little or no 
discernible improvement occurred and Michael Edwardes was brought in as CEO in 
1977.  He took improvement of industrial relations has his major project - poor 
industrial relations had been a major factor in the problems that the company was 
experiencing. As Edwardes described: 
‘What one had to do at that point was slim down the company to its 
competitive position, which meant a lot of people going, and then you’d 
got to slim down to the point when there wasn’t the volume, and so it 
went on. […] There had been enormous industrial relations problems 
and I think that I was doing a mopping-up job when I came in.’  
 
‘For 10 years there were no product profit and loss accounts.  It took us 
into ’78, I went in in November, we got our first stab at product 
profitability in the first half of ’78.  I couldn’t believe it.  For 10 years 
they were flying blind’. 
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This further illustrates the difficulty with the management system of the 
enterprise, but the emphasis on industrial relations, however essential, produced 
another side effect, which Edwardes freely acknowledges, and that was a diversion of 
attention away from other pressing matters: 
 
‘We got distracted. Where the Germans were spending 80% of their time 
on product, I was spending 80% of my time on industrial relations, so 
that was a total waste.’ 
 
By the end of the Edwardes period in 1982, output stabilized at around 400-
500,000 units per annum, and industrial relations had improved, due to Edwardes’ 
efforts to break the power of the more militant trade unions on the shopfloor. The 
company had been rationalized considerably, had been renamed ‘BL’, there was now 
an integrated model programme, and there was considerably more coherence than there 
had been 10 years before. The company was developing a new range of models in the 
the Metro, Maestro and Montego, but sales of current models were falling, and 
BLMC’s new executive car (the Rover SD1, launched in 1977) on which much 
depended, was beset with quality problems and failed to meet its sales targets. This 
failure followed the failures of the Allegro (a small to mid-sized car) and the TR7 (a 
two-seater sports car). Combined with product inadequacies, these failures reduced 
sales volumes to levels that made independent viability impossible, as the company lost 
the resources and capacity to renew itself through new product development. 
 Recognizing the product development shortfalls in the company, and the acute 
need for a model to plug the mid-range gap until the Maestro came on stream, BL 
sought a partner who could provide it with a new model. An alliance was struck with 
Honda of Japan in 1979. At the time BL was actually the larger car company, a sign of 
the stark contrast between Honda’s growth and BL’s decline since that time.  Honda 
was a partner to Rover for 15 years, and provided Rover with a number of successful 
new models throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, but the partnership ended abruptly 
when Rover’s owner, BAe, sold Rover to BMW in 1994. It is clear that BL/Rover 
learnt a great deal from Honda, though there were clear tensions as the different 
standards of the two companies were reconciled. As one of our Honda interviewees 
commented: 
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‘We found that on average each Rover-produced car had well over 100 
faults.  Many of these faults were very small, but Honda standards were 
high and our attitude was that in order to maintain our standards, every 
fault however small, had to be dealt with […] Of course we reported to 
Rover what we had found.  Their response was one of disbelief.  They 
said that, in general, their customers were finding few faults in the 
Rover versions of the cars in question and they could not accept the 
Honda results. There was a lot of discussion between the two companies 
and we explained the Honda attitude and tried to demonstrate the faults.’ 
 
The same interviewee also commented that there was, at best, ambivalence on 
the part of some very senior people at Rover about the Honda relationship, and a 
continuing reluctance to accept and act upon Honda’s advice:  
 
‘I was aware that there wasn’t wholehearted support, among quite a lot 
of senior Rover people, for the relationship.  I think that the position 
broadly was that people didn’t like the relationship very much; they 
didn’t necessarily want to work very closely with Honda, but they did 
see – a lot of them saw – that it was necessary.’ 
 
The consequence of these different approaches was graphically illustrated by 
the reception of the Honda Legend and Rover 800 (Sterling) in the US. This was a joint 
development between the two firms, and was the model that was supposed to re-launch 
Rover in the US market. The underlying design of the two derivatives was essentially 
the same, yet the Honda version was virtually at the top of the JD Power quality index 
when the Rover version was almost at the bottom of the same ranking.  Analysis of the 
failures revealed that it was largely the Rover-designed or Rover-modified parts that 
were the source of these problems. 
 
1987-1994 Privatisation and BAe  
 When the company was nationalized in 1975, a Labour government sympathetic 
to state ownership was in power. From 1979 onwards there were a succession of 
Conservative governments, led by Margaret Thatcher, who were deeply opposed to the 
idea of state ownership, and whose agenda was to return the company to private 
ownership – or close it down – as rapidly as possible. The right hand side of Figure 2 
shows this process in action, with those parts of the business that were considered 
saleable sold off between 1984 and 1987. Jaguar was privatized in 1984 and then 
bought by Ford in 1989, Unipart and Leyland Trucks were sold in 1985-6 and then 
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finally the cars group, by then including Land Rover, was sold to BAe in 1987. In the 
same way that Edwardes described how industrial relations issues were a distraction in 
the 1970s, interviewees from this period described how the priorities when preparing a 
business to be sold for sale are quite different to those when one is planning to grow 
and develop the business in the long term. Moreover, despite the Thatcher 
Government’s commitment to market forces, the matter of privatization was not purely 
a commercial one. The near sale of the commercial vehicle operations, which at that 
time included Land Rover, to General Motors in 1986 foundered on a political decision 
that Land Rover should remain under British ownership. 
 Despite some rhetoric at the time about synergies between BAe’s aerospace 
operation and Rover’s car operations, by all accounts BAe was ‘a hands-off’ owner. 
Under the leadership of Graham Day, serious attention was given to image and 
branding, and in what was know as the ‘Roverization’ period all non 4x4 models were 
badged as Rover, the MG brand being revived in the mid 1990s with the MGF sports 
car. The aim was to position Rover as an upmarket, premium brand. 
 However, as British Aerospace came under increasing financial pressure their 
continued ownership of Rover was called into question. A Board member from this 
period described the situation as follows: 
‘[BAe] ran out of money, and went to the shareholders to raise more 
money.  The offer to the shareholders was underwritten by banks, and 
the shareholders declined to give BAe any more money, so the banks 
were stuffed and had to put a lot of money into BAe.  And that’s why 
BAe subsequently didn’t feel it could support the Rover cash flows, and 
looked for an owner for Rover.  […]  The Chairman, and the Chief 
Executive, and subsequently the Finance Director of BAe all left as a 
result of that failed rights issue, and the new blood who came into BAe 
looked around and said, ‘Rover’s got to go.’ 
 
 The decision by BAe to sell to BMW was controversial, as many observers felt 
that Rover’s interests would be better served by a continuing relationship with Honda. 
Honda interviewees reported that at the time of the sale, Honda felt that Rover had 
made progress, that Rover’s standards of manufacturing were rising, and might reach 
Honda’s expectations within two years. However, Rover was very dependent on Honda 
for their product engineering by this stage, a factor that BMW seem to have 
underestimated. 
 During the Honda period BL/Rover’s output had remained fairly stable 
although now below half a million units a year - too low a volume to be sustainable in 
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the volume market where margin per unit is relatively low. However, this stability of 
output occurred against a backdrop of a rising market, and domestic market share 
actually slipped from around 20% to 15% during BAe’s ownership, as Figure 4 shows. 
 
Take in Figure 4 
 
1994-2000 BMW  
 Perhaps the single biggest mystery in the Rover story is why things went so 
wrong during the BMW period. When BMW bought Rover, Rover was not in a 
particularly strong position, but losses had been stemmed, some small profits had been 
returned and there was a reasonable range of models, though the small car (the Metro) 
was desperately overdue for replacement. Under BAe’s ownership, in order to save 
money, it had been decided to try to combine coverage of Rover 200 category with the 
Metro category in the form of the 1995 Rover 200, larger than a Metro, but smaller than 
the previous 200 series, a strategy which turned out to be misguided. 
 BMW appeared to over-estimate Rover’s basic capabilities when they first took 
them over. Moreover, they also seem to have thought that the Rover-Honda 
relationship would continue after BMW’s purchase of Rover, something which Honda 
was not prepared to do. As a Honda Board member from the period explained: 
 
‘…a lot of people have asked why Honda was willing to work with 
Rover, but not with BMW.  The official position was that we were 
willing to help a British company with the aim of that company 
becoming a self-sustaining, independent entity.  We had no desire to 
own the company.  BMW was a German company with no need of help.  
The circumstances were different.  In reality, we did not want to work 
with BMW.  It was a big, successful company and we did not see where 
getting involved would lead’.    
 
 Thus, although Honda continued to allow Rover to use Honda designs for a fee 
(something which they were legally under no obligation to do) the relationship and the 
associated support effectively ended at the point of sale.  BMW did not immediately 
step in to replace this. As a senior Rover product planner described to us: 
 
‘[BMW] were extremely professional, to the extent that they’d all had 
their British cultural training, and they understood that we liked to start 
all meetings with a joke, so we would get a standard joke at the 
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beginning of every meeting, which was embarrassing to the extreme.  
[…] but the real reason is, I don’t think they could countenance coming 
in to a company, and coming in with jackboots.  They would be so 
unpopular, and culturally it would be bad karma, whatever, for them.  
They couldn’t do it, so they let us carry on, trying to influence us, almost 
like they would only come in if we really failed.  It was a disaster.  They 
should have come in, they should have come in and really shaken us up, 
really been critical, but they didn’t.  They’d left the management as was, 
left the plan as was…’ 
 
Thus, if the problem in the past had been high variety coupled with the lack of a 
capable management unit, the situation was now of a much slimmed-down set of 
operations, but an owner that either did not understand the operations of the company it 
had bought, or which understood these, but perceived social and cultural obstacles to 
intervention. 
 Differences within BMW about Rover eventually led to the resignations of both 
Pischetsreider, the CEO of BMW and a supporter of BMW’s relationship with Rover 
and Reitzler, the number two, who was opposed to it. BMW began to look for ways to 
rid itself of Rover, and entered in negotiations with Alchemy, an equity capital firm 
specializing in turnarounds. This revealed that Rover’s management, such a source of 
weakness for so many years, still posed major problems. As Jon Moulton, Alchemy’s 
CEO described to us: 
 
‘By the time we [Alchemy] got to it with BMW, the patient was terribly ill, 
the volumes were far too low, but still the financial control was as bad as it 
had ever been.  BMW were unable to tell us, during negotiations, anything 
about the management accounts of Rover.  We didn’t believe them, we 
thought they were just hiding it.  The only figures they could give us were 
the amount of money they were putting in each month, they gave us some 
numbers on the numbers of cars being sold by Rover; those numbers, 
unfortunately - as reported to the BMW senior management - were not 
actually the numbers of cars they were selling, they were the numbers on 
the spreadsheet out of the five year plan.  And that’s the honest truth.  So 
the senior management of BMW didn’t even know what volume of cars 
Rover were producing.’ 
 
 Alchemy’s bid to buy Rover was turned down in favour of the Phoenix 
consortium headed by John Towers, former CEO of Rover. Land Rover was sold to 
Ford for £1.8 billion, while BMW retained the Cowley plant to produce the New Mini, 
which became part of the BMW Group as an independent brand. 
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Take in Figure 5 
 
2000-2005 Phoenix 
When Phoenix bought Rover in 2000 it was already obvious to many industry 
experts that the company could not survive, unless a joint venture partner could soon be 
found. In terms of our capabilities framework, Rover was no longer a fully capable car 
company, and in fact had not been for some time.  In retrospect, one could criticize the 
Phoenix directors for portraying the illusion that MG Rover was viable enough to 
survive, but given their need to secure a partner, this was perhaps the only line that they 
could take. By 2000 the merger wave that the auto industry had seen throughout the 
1990s had subsided, and it became clear that many large-scale mergers such as the one 
between Daimler and Chrysler were not yielding the hoped-for benefits. In May 2007 
the DaimlerChrysler merger was largely unwound, with the sale of 80% of Chrysler to 
Cerberus Capital Management.  
In addition, overcapacity had become a key concern in the industry. As a 
consequence there was no rationale for any of the established players to buy Rover, 
who by this time offered little other than some aging models and assembly capacity of 
average quality in a region with little prospect for growth in sales. The only possibility 
for Rover was to seek partners in markets that showed real growth, such as China. 
Chinese manufacturers, while plentiful in number, are short on technology, and all 
foreign manufacturers that established operations in China have been compelled to set 
up joint ventures with Chinese companies. Chinese and foreign manufacturers alike are 
mainly concerned with establishing their position in the Chinese domestic market, so 
the interest in Rover by Brilliance in 2002 and SAIC in 2004 was geared towards 
getting access to Rover’s technology (which was still marketable in China and other 
developing regions), and possibly its brands. 
The Alchemy vs Phoenix question demonstrates a tension that is repeatedly visible 
in the history of Rover, and which illustrates the significance of Beer’s observation on 
how the divergence of goals impacts on system viability. Until the reforms in the late 
1970s, the union agenda of protecting employment (in the short term) impeded reforms 
and factory closures that may otherwise have occurred on the basis of purely 
commercial criteria. It is arguable whether creating a successful car company was ever 
particularly high on British Aerospace’s agenda, given their focus on short-term 
financial issues. The sale to Phoenix promised fewer job losses in the short-term, but it 
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was never clear how the company could attain viability, and there was deep hostility to 
Alchemy’s more radical proposal to create a significantly smaller, but possibly longer-
lived, business.  
As Batchelor (2001) points out, the union’s position over redundancy payment 
liabilities made a deal with Alchemy very difficult. The Alchemy bid, which would 
have meant downsizing the company to a small-scale niche sports car maker under the 
MG brand, would nonetheless have been a much more sustainable option. On the other 
hand this would have meant immediate redundancies at Longbridge of at least 4,500 
workers, most likely even more. Under Phoenix, the 9,060 Longbridge workers of the 
total 32,070 Rover employees all kept their jobs in the first instance (Rover Task Force 
Report, 2000), although under BMW the workforce had already reduced by 7,000 
workers, most of whom took voluntary redundancy (Batchelor, 2001), and again under 
Phoenix the Rover workforce at Longbridge reduced to 5,100 by 2005. Hence, Phoenix 
cushioned redundancies from a projected 9,060 in 2000 to 5,100 in 2005. The latter 
should also be seen in perspective, for as we have seen, the Rover Group was in fact 
gradually split up from 1984 onwards, and many of these businesses (Jaguar, Land 
Rover, Mini, Unipart) are still in operation, but under the protective wing of foreign 
capital. Figure 5 shows that when the output of Jaguar (Ford), Land Rover (Ford) and 
Mini (BMW) is taken into account, output is about the same as it has been since the late 
1970s, at around 400,000 units per annum.  These operations are not without their 
problems, particularly Jaguar, but the fact that they have all continued to exist, and 
indeed to grow, under alternative owners, supports the idea that the new owners 
brought capabilities that Rover itself lacked. Even so, the picture has not been one of 
unqualified success, with Ford putting Jaguar and Land Rover up for sale in June 2007, 
as part of a restructuring plan. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This data presented in this paper illustrate how Rover’s collapse was a 
culmination of a process that started more than four decades previously: a series of 
failed attempts at consolidation and rationalisation, a persistent inability to develop 
products that hit the right markets, and missed opportunities with different partners all 
led to a situation in which the company eventually consumed its own capital in order to 
stem its operating losses.  
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At the outset, this paper set out to explore three questions. The first question 
concerned how the failure of the company could be understood, and in this respect the 
company’s history carries a number of lessons. First, the company was clearly much 
more than just a commercial enterprise, and had, at various times in its life, to reconcile 
the wishes of multiple stakeholders with very different agendas, something which Beer 
has identified as a threat to system viability. From a commercial point of view in the 
1970s reform was delayed because of the politically unpalatable consequences of job 
losses. In the 1980s, the privatization agenda led to some decisions that did not 
necessarily make sense from a commercial point of view, including the vetoing of the 
potential sale of the company to non-British buyers.  Even in 2000, considerations of 
employment protection seem to have outweighed commercial ones. 
 This lack of focus was aggravated by what might be termed ‘the missing 
development step’. The formation of BLMC, which later became Leyland and then 
Rover, created an enormous conglomerate from a set of previously relatively small and 
independent firms. Some of these were in weak and precarious positions well before the 
merger. In Beer’s terms, the conglomerate lacked a management unit of the scale and 
sophistication to deal with the combination of overall complexity and weaknesses in 
the operating units. Hence the situation became worse, not better, with the relatively 
strong firms being pulled down by the weaker ones.  
 That a large, complex and difficult-to-manage organization was created without 
an adequate management unit was one part of the problem. However, in the case of 
Rover, several other factors hit at the same time, putting additional load on already the 
already over-pressed centre. The company was running out of cash at the time of the 
merger, and was not generating sufficient funds to resource its own product 
development; the UK’s entry into the Common Market exposed the firm to the full 
force of foreign competition at a time when it was weak; labour relations issues 
preoccupied Michael Edwardes who was perhaps the strongest of the firm’s CEOs; and 
so on. Following Ashby (1956), Beer (1984) argues that ‘the management unit’ must 
have the capacity to process the inputs that it receives from its own operating units as 
well as other sources; selective attention is the inevitable consequence of a mismatch in 
capacity and load. In this paper we have followed Beer in terming this key capability 
the ‘management unit’, but this is really a shorthand term for a whole series of 
capabilities – in financial control, portfolio management, marketing and so on – that 
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Rover lacked. A capable management system also delivers sufficient consistency over 
time to permit consistent brand values, something that Rover struggled to do. 
 In our view, this high-level integration is a generally neglected area by 
Operations Management as a discipline – Operations Management researchers often 
focus on very specific processes or subsystems such as manufacturing, product 
development, supply chain management or technology acquisition and tends to 
overlook the governance systems that connect all of these subsystems together. This 
may be because the traditional business disciplines tend to carve up the world in ways 
that allows detailed, nuanced dissection of particular functions or processes 
(‘subsystems’, in the parlance of Beer) to the neglect of issues around how the 
integration of these subsystems occurs.  Operations Management researchers clearly do 
at times consider issues that span functional areas (e.g. the relationship between 
manufacturing and product development; the role of suppliers in product development) 
but holistic analyses of how all the pieces fit together - or fail to - are unusual.  
The second question, to what extent do the patterns we find in the Rover case 
apply to other examples of failure, is more difficult to answer. The Rover case is 
unusual, in that such a large enterprise was created so quickly from so many weak 
units. However, we would argue that although it is an extreme case, it demonstrates a 
number of principles that apply across many situations. These apply particularly to 
organizations or other systems that are in crisis, where there are failings in several 
organizational subsystems simultaneously, and where undue load is placed on the 
management unit. One interpretation of the Rover case is that there was a race between 
developing the management unit and simplifying the company’s operations on the one 
hand and the rate of decline on the other. In the end, it was the rate of decline that 
triumphed. The same processes may also be seen in turnarounds, mergers and 
acquisitions, and other situations in which companies face major shocks.  
 Finally, the Rover case demonstrates the usefulness of systems ideas to 
understanding at least some types of failure, not as an alterative to capability-based 
approaches, but in addition to them. Despite being perceived in public as a fully 
capable car company and commended by commentators on its manufacturing 
improvements as recently as 1994 (see Pilkington, 1996), in many ways Rover lost the 
ability to be a fully capable car company well before that. Successive other capabilities 
were lost over the years, but right up to the end, because the vehicles were still “rolling 
off the line”, many still thought of the company as a ‘complete’ car company. If 
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anything, our study shows that judging a firm’s competitiveness by defining it as a set 
of capabilities at the level of subsystems is not sufficient. Analysis of the ‘management 
units’ that coordinate these sub-systems can, we argue, offer considerable insight into 
the reasons behind corporate success and failure.  
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Figure 1: Capabilities Framework 
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corporate management and control; financial control; portfolio management; brand 
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Table 1: The seven core capabilities 
 
Capability The ability to… 
Market and competitor analysis Identify market trends and competitor actions 
and feed this intelligence into strategic decisions 
Technology development Acquire, develop and deploy technology 
Product development Develop competitive new products in a timely 
and cost-effective way 
Manufacturing Match market demand with supply, to 
competitive cost and quality levels 
Component supply Identify suppliers who can develop competitive 
sub-systems and components and supply these to 
the right levels of cost, quality and delivery 
Retail and distribution Establish and operate systems of retail, 
distribution and aftermarket support in the 
appropriate markets  
Management unit Allocate and control resources, establish and 
enforce standards, manage the 
diversity/uniformity across subsystems (e.g. 
functions and divisions) and over time  
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Figure 2: Rover’s ‘family tree’ 
1968: 
British 
Leyland 
Motor 
Corporation
Limited 
(BLMC)
formed
1968: 
British 
Leyland 
otor 
Corporation
Li ited 
(BL C)
for ed
Leyland Motor 
Company 
(est. 1896)
Leyland otor 
Co pany 
(est. 1896)
1966: 
British Motor 
Holdings 
formed
1966: 
British otor 
Holdings 
for ed
1952: 
British Motor 
Company (BMC) 
formed
1952: 
British otor 
Co pany (B C) 
for ed
Jaguar 
(Swallow Sidecar 
Company prior to 
WWII; est. 1922)
Jaguar 
(Swallow Sidecar 
Co pany prior to 
II; est. 1922)
Austin Motor 
Company
(est. 1905)
Austin otor 
Co pany
(est. 1905)
Morris Motors 
Company 
(Nuffield 
Organisation)
(est. 1913)
Brands:
Wolseley,
MG (Morris 
Garages),
Riley 
orris otors 
Co pany 
(Nuffield 
rganisation)
(est. 1913)
Brands:
olseley,
 ( orris 
arages),
Riley 
Rover 
(est. 1877, first 
car in 1904)
Rover 
(est. 1877, first 
car in 1904)
1948: Land Rover 
is introduced
1877: Standard 
Motor Company 
(est. 1877)
1877: Standard 
otor Co pany 
(est. 1877)
Triumph Motor 
Company 
(est. 1885, first 
car in 1921)
Triu ph otor 
Co pany 
(est. 1885, first 
car in 1921)
Daimler Motor 
Syndicate/
Company
(est. 1893/96) 
Dai ler otor 
Syndicate/
Co pany
(est. 1893/96) 
Birmingham 
Small Arms Co. 
(est. 1861)
Bir ingha  
S all Ar s Co. 
(est. 1861)
1960: 
Daimler part of 
BSA sold to 
Jaguar
Alvis
(est. 1919)
Alvis
(est. 1919)
1975: 
Ryder Report, 
BLMC 
nationalised 
and renamed 
to British 
Leyland Ltd., 
in 1978 to   
BL Ltd.
1975: 
Ryder Report, 
BL C 
nationalised 
and rena ed 
to British 
Leyland Ltd., 
in 1978 to   
BL Ltd.
1967
1960
1945
1965
1910
1978: Land Rover 
becomes own 
subsidiary
1979 –1994: 
Collaboration with Honda; 
Honda takes 20% 
of Rover equity, Rover takes a 20% 
stake in Honda Motor Europe.     
Five joint models are developed.
1979 –1994: 
Collaboration with Honda; 
Honda takes 20  
of Rover equity, Rover takes a 20  
stake in Honda otor Europe.     
Five joint odels are developed.
1981: 
Alvis sold to 
United Scientific 
Holdings
1981: 
Alvis sold to 
United Scientific 
Holdings
1981: 
BL Ltd. 
renamed 
BL Public 
Limited 
Company
1981: 
BL Ltd. 
rena ed 
BL Public 
Li ited 
Co pany
1984: 
Jaguar floated off 
and bought by Ford 
in 1989
1984: 
Jaguar floated off 
and bought by Ford 
in 1989
1986: 
BL Ltd 
renamed 
Rover 
Group plc 
1986: 
BL Ltd 
rena ed 
Rover 
roup plc 
1986-87: 
Leyland and Unipart 
are sold off
1986-87: 
Leyland and Unipart 
are sold off
1994: 
BMW 
buys 
Rover 
Group, 
col-
laboration
with 
Honda 
ends
1994: 
B  
buys 
Rover 
roup, 
col-
laboration
with 
Honda 
ends
2000: 
BMW sells 
individual 
parts of 
Rover 
Group
2000: 
B  sells 
individual 
parts of 
Rover 
roup
Land Rover 
and its 
Solihulll
plant & 
Gaydon
R&D facility
sold to Ford
Land Rover 
and its 
Solihulll
plant & 
aydon
R&D facility
sold to Ford
Mini brand 
and Cowley
plant
retained by 
BMW
ini brand 
and Cowley
plant
retained by 
B
Longbridge
operations 
sold to 
Phoenix;  
renamed 
MG Rover 
Group.  
Ceases 
operations 
in 2005, 
assets are 
sold to 
Chinese 
firm NAIC.
Longbridge
operations 
sold to 
Phoenix;  
rena ed 
 Rover 
roup.  
Ceases 
operations 
in 2005, 
assets are 
sold to 
Chinese 
fir  NAIC.
1959: Mini is 
introduced
by BMC
1988: 
Rover 
Group plc 
sold to 
British
Aerospace 
(BAe)
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Figure 3: Car production at BL/Rover, 1970-2005  
(excludes Jaguar, Land Rover and New Mini) 
Source: Company Accounts 
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Figure 4: BLMC/Rover’s UK market share, 1968-2005 
 
Source: Company Accounts 
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Figure 5: Production of Rovers, Land Rovers and New Minis, 1970-2005 
Source: Company Accounts 
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